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I. INTRODUCTION
While public opinion largely dictates that shackling is too barbaric for
civilized society, it happens with frightening frequency.1 A majority of
states shackle female prisoners during childbirth; forty states allow the
shackling of female prisoners during labor, delivery, and post-partum
recovery.2 Some women give birth alone in their cells, despite statutes
dictating that these women must receive medical attention.3 While
shackling is illegal in several states, such as Illinois, California, and New
York, these efforts are not sufficient because far too many states legalize
the practice.4 Further, even in states where shackling is illegal, waves of
lawsuits claiming that shackling practices continue are prevalent despite the
laws banning the practice.5
However, there are encouraging times ahead, as states such as Tennessee
and Georgia are drafting legislation prohibiting shackling.6 Recently, in
1. See Editorial, One Protection for Prisoners, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 14, 2009, at A30,
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/10/14/opinion/14wed3.html?_r=1 (defining
shackling as the practice of placing women in leg shackles, handcuffs, and a belly chain
with a box that connects the handcuffs and belly chain).
2. See Colleen Mastony, Childbirth in Chains, CHI. TRIB., July 18, 2010,
http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2010-07-18/news/ct-met-shackled-mothers20100718_1_shackles-handcuffs-labor (contending that most sheriff officials consider
labor to be only the moments immediately before birth). But cf. Reviewed by Louise
Chang MD, Normal Labor and Delivery Process, WEBMD, Feb. 1, 2010, at 1,
available at http://www.webmd.com/baby/guide/normal-labor-and-delivery-process
(considering labor to begin whenever contractions start, known as the latent stage).
3. See Rachel Roth, Pregnant, in Prison and Denied Care, THE NATION, Dec. 21,
2009, available at http://www.thenation.com/article/pregnant-prison-and-denied-care
(recounting various situations in which prison officials denied inmates proper medical
attention during labor).
4. See generally AMNESTY INT’L USA, ABUSE OF WOMEN IN CUSTODY: SEXUAL
MISCONDUCT AND SHACKLING OF PREGNANT WOMEN A STATE-BY-STATE SURVEY OF
POLICIES AND PRACTICES IN THE USA (2001) [hereinafter AMNESTY INT’L USA, ABUSE
OF WOMEN IN CUSTODY] (giving state by state reports of statutes outlining shackling
policies).
5. See Mastony, supra note 2 (reporting that since 2008, more than twenty former
female inmates have filed lawsuits against the Cook County Sheriff’s office alleging
incidents of shackling while giving birth).
6. See Jane E. Allen, Shackled: Women Behind Bars Deliver in Chains Federal
Prisons Ban Practice, But 40 States Still Allow Shackling of Incarcerated Pregnant
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the landmark decision Nelson v. Correctional Medical Services, the United
States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit declared shackling
unconstitutional and in violation of the Eighth Amendment.7
This Comment argues that pro-shackling laws are unconstitutional,
violating the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition against cruel and unusual
punishment because shackling not only causes excessive physical pain, it
deprives prisoners of a constitutionally guaranteed level of medical care.8
Part II discusses the history of shackling, its prevalence and health
implications, and the statutory medical standards of care for prisoners.9
Part III argues that states that currently allow shackling are employing what
should be illegal methods in violation of the U.S. Constitution.10 Part IV
discusses how other states should implement anti-shackling legislation.11
Finally, Part V concludes that the Nelson Court and state statutes
prohibiting shackling could provide a foundation for courts interpreting
state statutes that permit shackling to find this practice unconstitutional.12
II. BACKGROUND
A. America’s Shackling Epidemic
The majority of female inmates shackled during labor are non-violent
offenders and are not considered flight risks.13 Samantha L., a Wisconsin
Women, ABC NEWS MED. UNIT, Oct. 21, 2010, at 3, available at
http://abcnews.go.com/Health/WomensHealth/pregnant-shackled-women-bars-deliverchains/story?id=11933376&page=1 (noting that there are still some legislative
setbacks, like in California where Gov. Schwarzenegger vetoed a statute that would
have extended the prohibition on shackling throughout an inmate’s pregnancy).
7. See U.S. CONST. amend. VIII (declaring it illegal to inflict cruel or unusual
punishment). See generally 583 F.3d 522 (8th Cir. 2009) (en banc) (holding that
shackling inflicts cruel and unusual punishment).
8. See Nelson v. Corr. Med. Servs., 583 F.3d at 531-32 (holding that shackling is
cruel and unusual punishment under the Constitution); see also CAL. GOV’T CODE §
845.6 (West 2011) (providing a statutory minimum standard of care for prisoners);
D.C. CODE § 24-211.02 (2011) (providing a minimum standard of care for prisoners);
745 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 10/4-105 (West 2011) (providing a statutory minimum
standard of care for prisoners); N.Y. CORRECT. LAW § 508 (McKinney 2011).
9. See infra Part II (outlining that at the state level, no legal or medical
justification exists for the use of shackling).
10. See infra Part III (arguing that states allowing shackling should recognize that it
violates human decency, and adopt the legislative intent of states with anti-shackling
legislation).
11. See infra Part IV (arguing that states like Tennessee and Georgia should follow
the California and New York model to ensure that their shackling legislation is
enforced).
12. See infra Part V (applying the standards set forth in Estelle and Nelson, stating
that shackling violates the Eighth Amendment).
13. See Allen, supra note 6 (noting that the majority of women in prison today are
there for drug offenses or other non-violent crimes).
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inmate, gave birth with her ankles shackled eighteen inches apart.14 Her
shackles remained in place until moments before the actual birth of her
child.15
Inmate Latiana W. is one of several suing the Cook County, Illinois,
Sheriff’s Office for using restraints on prisoners in labor, contrary to
Illinois law.16 Despite multiple objections from her attending physician,
the corrections officer present during Latiana’s labor refused to remove the
restraints.17 As a result, her physician could not administer an epidural.18
Being shackled also hindered her childbirth, as Latiana could not properly
position her legs to push out the placenta.19
Another horrifying experience happened in Florida’s Collier County
Jail.20 In this case, Joan repeatedly pleaded for medical help because she
began leaking amniotic fluid, but officers denied and ignored her.21 By the
time she finally received an ultrasound—two weeks later—her doctor
informed her that she had leaked out all of her amniotic fluid and, as a
result, her fetus’s skull had collapsed.22
It is unclear exactly how and why the practice of shackling originated,
but many historians believe the practice began in the 1970s when criminal
justice facilities began adopting gender-neutral policies.23 The main
justifications for shackling are maintaining security and decreasing flight
14. Press Release, Amnesty Int’l USA, States Policies Fail to Protect Women From
Sexual Misconduct in Prison, Allow Shackling During Pregnancy & Labor, Amnesty
International Finds (Mar. 2, 2006), available at http://www.commondreams.org/cgibin/print.cgi?file=/news2006/0302-06.htm (stating how doctors required that Samantha
pace for several hours while in labor with her ankles shackled leaving them raw).
15. See id. (recounting when the corrections officer permanently appointed to stand
guard in her room finally removed the shackles).
16. See Mastony, supra note 2 (revealing how Latiana is one of the twenty inmates
to come forward since 2008 to accuse Cook County of continuing to use these practices
contrary to Illinois law).
17. See id. (stating how the corrections officer removed the shackles only ten
minutes before the actual birth of Latiana’s son and then replaced them immediately
afterward).
18. See id. (describing the unnecessary and excessive pain Latiana experienced
during her labor).
19. See id. (noting how the immediate replacement of the shackles resulted in
Latiana not being able to safely finish her delivery).
20. See Roth, supra note 3 (illustrating the total lack of regard for proper inmate
care through repeatedly denied requests for medical attention).
21. See id. (showing how in this case, the prisoner did not even have the luxury of
being shackled to a bed).
22. See id. (recounting that continued denial of medical care on behalf of jail
officials, even after diagnosis of fetal death, caused staggering increase in threat of
septic shock and death).
23. See Mastony, supra note 2 (noting that because male prisoners are shackled
during any type of hospitalization, including surgery, this practice was then applied to
female prisoners during childbirth).
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risk.24 However, the justifications for shackling pale in comparison to the
severe damage and degradation it causes.25 What is clear is that shackling
The shackling policies
affects a significant amount of women.26
themselves hearken back to an era that considered convicted women
morally subhuman and especially condemned any evidence of sexual
activity.27 Many jurisdictions failed to modify these restraint policies to
accommodate pregnancy.28 Shackling policies that consider the differences
between male and female inmates recognize that the shackling of female
inmates is less necessary.29 For example, women are more likely than men
to be serving time for a drug offense, and less likely to be serving time for a
violent crime.30
B. Shackling on a Case by Case Basis
1. Women Prisoners v. District of Columbia
A group of female prisoners sued the District of Columbia prisons in
Women Prisoners v. District of Columbia, alleging widespread Eighth
Amendment violations regarding the conditions of confinement for female
inmates.31 The D.C. Circuit Court reaffirmed that the only deprivations
that triggered Eighth Amendment scrutiny “are deprivations of essential
human needs.”32 The court amended the trial court’s ruling that shackling
24. See id. (noting that women in labor are a much lower safety and flight risk than
other prisoners).
25. See Adam Liptak, Prisons Often Shackle Pregnant Inmates in Labor, N.Y.
TIMES,
Mar.
2,
2006,
http://www.nytimes.com/2006/03/02/national/02shackles.html?_r=1&scp=1&sq=Ada
m+Liptak&st=nyt (arguing that shackling laws that seek to protect security officers
from a woman in labor, who has no previous history of violence, is not a legitimate
justification for shackling her).
26. See id. (noting an estimated five percent of women incarcerated in state prisons
and three percent of women incarcerated in federal prisons are pregnant upon
admission, resulting in approximately 2,000 births per year).
27. See L. MARA DODGE, WHORES AND THIEVES OF THE WORST KIND: A STUDY OF
WOMEN, CRIMES, AND PRISONS, 1835-2000, 30 (2002) (describing female penitentiary
inmates as unredeemable).
28. See Matony, supra note 2 (aligning the origin of shackling with the creation of
gender neutral policies resulting in the shackling of both male and female prisoners
when being transported to a hospital regardless of their condition).
29. See DODGE, supra note 27, at 30 (noting that women have shorter, less violent
criminal histories than men; while more than half of male prisoners have committed
two or fewer offenses, compared to two-thirds of female prisoners); see also Mastony
supra note 2 (noting that most women in Cook County are in jail for nonviolent
crimes).
30. See id. (noting that men are twice as likely as women to be violent recidivists).
31. See generally 93 F.3d 910, 913 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (alleging violations of various
statutory and constitutional provisions such as sexual abuse of prisoners and inadequate
medical care).
32. See id. at 928 (quoting Inmates of Occoquan v. Barry, 844 F.2d 828, 836 (D.C.
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violates the Eighth Amendment, and rejected the provision that prisons
have written protocols regarding the use of restraints on pregnant women.33
While the District of Columbia Department of Corrections’ (DOC) protocol
supposedly prohibits the use of restraints during labor, delivery, and
recovery, unless the woman has demonstrated a history of violent behavior,
the District of Columbia (D.C.) has no actual legislation limiting the use of
shackling on pregnant inmates.34 Thus, pursuant to Women Prisoners and
current law, D.C. has some limits on the practice of shackling, but does not
ban the practice outright.35
2. Nelson v. Correctional Medical Services
More recent is the notable anti-shackling case of Nelson v. Correctional
Medical Services, where the court strengthened constitutional protections
against shackling methods.36 The pregnant prisoner in Nelson entered the
Arkansas prison system on June 3, 2003, for credit fraud.37 On September
20, 2003, she started experiencing labor pains; upon arrival at the hospital,
the officer shackled her to a wheelchair and wheeled her to the maternity
ward.38 At more than seven centimeters dilated, the officer then shackled
Nelson to a bed.39 The Eighth Circuit held that the law “clearly
established” that shackling a woman prisoner during labor and delivery
violated the Eighth Amendment, imposing cruel and unusual punishment.40
The court also discussed the standard of confinement and medical care, and
found that the security officer acted with deliberate indifference.41 The
Cir. 1988)).
33. See id. at 932, 944 (vacating an order requiring prison officials to develop a
written protocol for prenatal care, reasoning that the District Court did not have
supplemental jurisdiction as to this issue).
34. See AMNESTY INT’L USA, ABUSE OF WOMEN IN CUSTODY, supra note 4, at 321
(reporting policies in D.C. based on DOC responses to Amnesty International’s
surveys).
35. See Movement Builds to Stop Shackling Pregnant Prisoners, CRIME REP., Aug.
31, 2009, http://thecrimereport.org/2009/08/31/movement-builds-tostop-shacklingpregnant-prisoners (noting that suggested limits certainly do not carry the same effect
as actual legislation).
36. See generally 583 F.3d 522 (8th Cir. 2009) (en banc) (detailing the case of
Shawanna Nelson).
37. See id. at 522 (noting that Nelson was incarcerated for a non-violent offense).
38. See id. at 525-26 (noting that the officer later testified that Nelson remained
shackled despite the fact that the officer never felt threatened by her or thought Nelson
presented a escape risk).
39. See id. at 526 (noting that when a cervix has dilated seven centimeters that is
well into the final stages of labor).
40. See id. at 522 (assuming no security justification existed for the restrains such
as a history of violence).
41. See id. at 529 (noting how an Eighth Amendment claim of deliberate
indifference contains both a subjective and objective component).
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court further noted that either interference with care, or infliction of
unnecessary suffering establishes deliberate indifference in medical care
cases in violation of the Eighth Amendment.42
C. The Health Implications of and Justifications for Shackling
Shackling practices are degrading, barbaric, humiliating, and life
threatening to both mother and child.43 Pregnant women are already more
prone to tripping and falling because they have a different center of gravity:
shackling their arms or ankles, therefore increases the risk of them falling
on their stomachs.44 In addition, labor and delivery are extremely
unpredictable and waiting for a guard to remove a prisoner’s shackles can
have dire consequences.45 For example, it is important that the delivering
physician can quickly move and manipulate the mother to avoid potentially
life-threatening emergencies.46 In Nelson, the prisoner suffered a hip
dislocation and an umbilical hernia directly resulting from the shackles that
prevented movement of the prisoner’s legs.47
D. Medical Standards of Care for Prisoners
Several states have enacted legislation that prohibits shackling.48 In
2000, Illinois passed legislation prohibiting the use of leg irons or shackles
or waist shackles on any pregnant prisoner in labor.49 California followed
in 2006, enacting a statute banning shackling unless it is strictly necessary
for the safety of officers and the public.50 In 2009, New York similarly

42. See id. at 532 (noting that the determination of interference with medical care,
or the infliction of unnecessary suffering is an issue solely determined by the evidence
in a specific case).
43. See Allen, supra note 6 (stating that shackling not only impedes a safe birth,
but can cause immediate physical pain like raw ankles or wrists).
44. See id. (noting the potential for serious damage to the baby if the mother falls
on her stomach).
45. See id. (listing consequences including, dropping of a baby’s heart rate,
prohibiting the mother to change position to increase blood flow, or impeding a timely
emergency c-section).
46. See Nelson, 583 F.3d at 529 (explaining that shackling is inherently dangerous
to both mother and child).
47. See id. at 526 (stating that shackling caused a severe amount of pain and
requiring additional surgery for both injuries).
48. See AMNESTY INT’L USA, ABUSE OF WOMEN IN CUSTODY, supra note 4, at 13
(identifying Illinois, as the first, and New York, as the most recent, states to pass such
legislation).
49. See 55 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/3-15003.6 (West 2011) (prohibiting the use of
shackles during the transportation of a female prisoner prior to delivering a baby).
50. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 6030 (West 2011) (establishing standards of health for
pregnant women as well, such as a balanced diet and prenatal health care provided by a
doctor).
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banned the practice.51
There exists no shortage of instances where officers deny pregnant
inmates proper medical attention when the prisoners alert correctional
officers that they are in labor.52 The Illinois code regarding failure to
provide medical care to prisoners limits the liability of the public entity,
except where the employee knows that a prisoner is in need of medical care
and wantonly disregards the need.53 The statute strictly states that an
employee observing that a prisoner is in need of immediate medical care
must take reasonable action to summon such care.54 The California code is
almost identical, providing that an employee is liable only if they know or
have reason to know that a prisoner is in need of care and fail to try and
provide such care.55 New York provides that it is within the discretion of
the sheriff to determine if an inmate requires outside medical attention and
if that outside treatment is necessary.56 Finally, the D.C. code specifies that
the Department of Corrections shall have the power to provide for an
inmate’s proper treatment and care.57
Case law dictates the entitlement of inmates to specific standards of
care.58 In Estelle v. Gamble, the Supreme Court held that deliberate
indifference to a prisoner’s serious condition or injury constitutes cruel and
unusual punishment.59 The Court clearly held that the government has an
obligation to provide medical care to anyone incarcerated for the purpose

51. See N.Y. CORRECT. LAW § 611 (McKinney 2011) (providing the most recently
drafted anti-shackling legislation).
52. See, Mastony, supra note 2 (stating how inmates are often met with distrust and
disbelief when they inform officers they are pregnant).
53. See 745 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 10/4-105 (West 2011) (applying this standard
to the case of Latiana Watson where the correctional officer arguably knew that
Watson needed medical care and that the shackles were impeding the proper
administration of medical care, the officer could be found to have willfully and
wantonly failed to take reasonable action by removing the shackles).
54. See id. (noting that an employee who disobeys the requirement to summon
medical care is liable for injury proximately caused by lack of medical attention).
55. See CAL. GOV’T CODE § 845.6 (West 2011) (applying persuasive authority such
as the California statute, to a case such as that of Joan S. in Wisconsin, the correctional
officers could be held liable for their blatant disregard for the health of a prisoner if
Wisconsin were to adopt shackling legislation).
56. See N.Y. CORRECT. LAW § 508 (requiring that in-prison treatment is
insufficient to treat the prisoner).
57. See D.C. CODE § 24-211.02 (2011) (applying this standard to any case where
shackling or lack of medical attention interferes with the safety and efficiency of
childbirth).
58. See generally Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97 (1976) (holding that the Eighth
Amendment ensures prisoners a minimum standard of medical care).
59. See id. at 97 (stating that while the Court ultimately found that deliberate
indifference was not present, it did set forth a strict legal standard that prison officials
cannot willfully deny prisoners care).
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of punishment.60 The Court based the government’s obligation to provide
medical care on an evolving standard of human decency that it says is the
mark of a progressing and maturing society.61 The Court further held that
deliberate indifference to the serious medical needs of prisoners is an
“unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain” proscribed by the Eighth
Amendment.62
III. ANALYSIS
A. Shackling Deprives Prisoners of Their Constitutionally Guaranteed
Level of Medical Care Under Estelle v. Gamble.
Inmates still maintain constitutional rights while in prison.63 Prisoners
have an unalienable constitutional right to medical care.64 The willful
disregard of an inmate’s medical needs violates the Eighth Amendment.65
In Estelle, the Supreme Court explained that the acts or omissions
depriving an inmate of medical care must be sufficiently harmful so as to
show deliberate indifference to serious medical needs in order to be
unconstitutional.66 This deliberate indifference constitutes a willful
disregard of an inmate’s medical needs.67 Perhaps most notably, the Estelle
Court concluded that the deliberate indifference standard applies where a
prison guard intentionally denies or delays access to medical care, or
intentionally interferes with the treatment a prisoner is prescribed.68

60. See id. at 103 (stating that in the most extreme cases lack of attention to these
medical needs can actually produce physical torture or lingering death, and in less
severe cases may result in pain and suffering).
61. See id. at 102 (citing Jackson v. Bishop, 404 F.2d 571, 579 (8th Cir. 1968))
(stating that the elements of this standard are broad and idealistic civilized standards,
such as dignity, humanity, and decency).
62. See id. at 104 (noting that this standard holds true whether the indifference is
manifested by a prison doctor in response to a prisoner’s needs, or by the prison guards
intentionally denying or delaying access to medical care).
63. See Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 95 (1987) (holding that the status of
“prisoner” curbs some constitutional rights in the interest of legitimate objectives such
as deterrence of crime, rehabilitation, and internal security and order).
64. See Estelle, 429 U.S. at 103 (noting that denying an inmate medical care could
result in pain and suffering which would not serve a legitimate penological purpose).
65. See id. (holding that serious medical needs of prisoners cannot be ignored
under the Eighth Amendment).
66. See id. at 106 (stating that the Court is applying the Eighth Amendment
conditions of confinement standard of deliberate indifference).
67. See id. (reasoning that deliberate indifference and willful disregard are both
cruel and unusual, and therefore synonymous for the purposes of medical care under
the Eighth Amendment).
68. See id. at 104 (noting that the infliction of such unnecessary suffering is
inconsistent with contemporary standards of decency as manifested in modern
legislation codifying the common-law).
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Essentially, Estelle provides an undeniable anti-shackling standard
construed pursuant to the Constitution.69 An example of a flagrant
violation of the standard set forth in Estelle is the case of nineteen-year-old
Terra K., who pounded on the door to her cell as she went into labor, but
prison guards ignored her and she ultimately gave birth alone in her cell.70
This violates Estelle because the prison guards deliberately denied the
inmate medical care when she clearly had extremely delicate and
complicated medical needs.71 Prison guards intentionally interfered with
that inmate’s treatment by ignoring her cries that she was in labor and
denied her access to medical care by keeping her locked in her cell.72
While the case of Terra K. may not be facially unconstitutional under the
standard set forth in Estelle, it violates the Eighth Amendment, because
prison guards inflicted cruel and unusual punishment by denying Terra K.
access to medical care.73
Another example of a constitutional violation is the previously
mentioned case of Joan S.74 By the time prison guards actually allowed
Joan access to medical care, her doctor informed her that her fetus’s skull
had collapsed.75 Prison guards violated Joan’s Eighth Amendment right, as
they delayed taking her to the hospital and her acquisition of proper
medical attention.76 Prison guards violated the standard set forth in Estelle
entitling prisoners to medical care by forcing Joan to carry her dead child
for several days, an obvious health emergency that requires urgent medical
attention.77

69. See id. (noting that so long as the shackling of a prisoner is not an accident, any
time that shackling of a prisoner interferes with, denies, or delays a pregnant inmate’s
access to medical care, under Estelle, it is a violation of the Eighth Amendment).
70. See Roth, supra note 3 (recounting the case of an inmate in Dubuque County
Jail in Iowa where no one noticed her giving birth).
71. See generally Estelle, 429 U.S. at 104 (noting that it is a clear mark of human
decency—which the Court lays out as a necessary element of determining deliberate
indifference—to render assistance to a woman in labor).
72. See id. (noting that prisoners cannot care for themselves by reason of their
deprivation of liberty, and so they depend on the state for proper care).
73. See id. (using the Supreme Court’s standard that wanton infliction of
unnecessary pain violates the Eighth Amendment, and holding that forcing a woman to
give birth in her cell alone clearly constitutes wanton infliction of unnecessary pain).
74. See Roth, supra note 3 (recounting how Joan sought medical attention for two
weeks because she was near her due date and leaking amniotic fluid).
75. See id. (stating that doctors told Joan that the death of her fetus was a direct
result of the loss of all her amniotic fluid and that she was at severe risk of septic shock
the longer the dead fetus was inside her).
76. See id. (observing that prison guards were clearly aware of Joan’s medical
condition and intentionally delayed taking her to a hospital, preventing access to
necessary medical attention).
77. See id. (noting that such a severe infliction of pain and suffering clearly violates
the cruel and unusual punishment provision proscribed by the Eighth Amendment).
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Officials were deliberately indifferent when they denied Joan medical care
by refusing to take her to a doctor despite her repeated pleas; delayed
taking her to a hospital; forced her to carry her dead fetus; and delayed
getting her a necessary shot associated with her rare blood type that would
help prevent complications with future pregnancies.78 The behavior of the
jail officials in the case of Joan S. is a flagrant violation of her Eighth
Amendment rights, and a clear deprivation of her constitutionally protected
right to medical care.79
The act of chaining pregnant inmates to hospital beds during labor
constitutes deliberate indifference to the prisoners’ medical needs.80
Restricting a woman’s movement while she is in labor exacerbates the pain
and distress associated with the birthing process, and may lead to
complications that pose serious risks to the lives and health of both the
mother and her baby.81 Further, the shackling of inmates during labor
serves no legitimate objective because, although they are convicted felons,
it is extremely difficult—and in some cases impossible—for pregnant
inmates to either try and escape or pose a safety risk.82 Indeed, shackling a
woman to a bed during childbirth serves no justifiable penological purpose,
as her being pregnant would have no relevance on her sentence.83
Shackling during labor could have no deterrent effect on the original crime,
and thereby punishes the prisoner for bearing children, not for breaking the
law.84
While the Eighth Circuit ultimately found that shackling violates the
Eighth Amendment’s prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment,
Nelson’s ordeal also invokes a claim under the Estelle standard.85 Prison
officials refused to take Nelson to a hospital to give birth until she was

78. See id. at 103 (applying the Estelle standard, the jail officials’ deliberate
indifference to Joan’s serious illness constitutes cruel and unusual punishment,
violating the Eighth Amendment).
79. See id. at 103 (noting that the pain and suffering Joan experienced served no
penological purpose).
80. See AMNESTY INT’L USA, ABUSE OF WOMEN IN CUSTODY, supra note 4, at 23
(stating that such measures exacerbates the dangers of the childbearing process).
81. See id. (providing that an obligation not to put inmates in a situation of elevated
risk or purposefully cause a heightened and unnecessary amount of pain).
82. See Allen, supra note 6 (stating that if a woman has been given epidural
anesthesia, the numbness makes it impossible for her to run off).
83. See Nelson v. Corr. Med. Servs., 583 F.3d 522, 530 (8th Cir. 2009) (en banc)
(noting the argument that the shackling of inmates serves a security interest).
84. See AMNESTY INT’L USA, ABUSE OF WOMEN IN CUSTODY, supra note 4, at 3
(arguing that there is no legitimate punitive correlation between the original crime for
which the prisoner is incarcerated, and shackling her during childbirth).
85. See generally Nelson, 583 F.3d at 522 (upholding that shackling violates the
Constitution because it is an Eighth Amendment violation and because it infringes on a
prisoner’s constitutionally protected right to medical care).
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already in active labor.86 Nelson was still in leg shackles when she started
to deliver her baby, despite the repeated pleas of doctors and nurses to
remove the shackles.87
While decided under a different standard, Nelson clearly exhibits a
violation of a prisoner’s constitutionally protected right to medical care.88
When applying the standard of deliberate indifference to a serious medical
need, as in the Estelle case, it is clear that Nelson was not subject to
humane conditions of confinement.89 The prison infirmary nurse denied
and delayed Nelson’s access to medical care by sending her back to her cell
despite her nearing active labor.90 Further, the officer stationed on duty in
Nelson’s delivery room displayed deliberate indifference when she refused
to remove the shackles despite the requests of medical professionals.91 By
refusing to transport Nelson to the hospital in a timely manner, and refusing
to remove the shackles at the request of medical professionals causing
unnecessary bodily harm, the prison guards intentionally interfered with
Nelson’s access to medical care.92 This violated her constitutionally
protected right to medical care.93 In Estelle, the Supreme Court held that
denying, delaying, or inhibiting a prisoner’s access to medical care
constitutes cruel and unusual punishment.94 Under this standard shackling
is unconstitutional because, as was seen in Nelson, the act of shackling
clearly delays and inhibits a prisoner’s access to medical care.95
86. See Nelson v. Corr. Med. Services, 104CV00037 JMM-JWC, 2007 WL
1703562, at *2-3 (E.D. Ark. June 11, 2007) (recalling how Nelson had repeatedly
asked to be taken to the hospital and the infirmary nurse denied her request), rev’d in
part, 533 F.3d 958 (8th Cir. 2008) and aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 583 F.3d 522 (8th
Cir. 2009).
87. See Nelson, 583 F.3d at 526. (explaining that as a result of the shackles, every
time Nelson experienced a labor contraction her leg would cramp up and she would
experience severe pain, ultimately causing a dislocated hip).
88. See Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976) (showing that Nelson suffered
as a direct result of the deliberate indifference of the prison officials).
89. See Nelson, 583 F.3d at 529 (noting the adequate satisfaction of the objective
and subjective tests, and that the deliberate indifference to Nelson’s medical needs
caused cruel and unusual punishment as proscribed by the Eighth Amendment).
90. See Nelson, 2007 WL 1703562, at *2-3 (explaining the importance in taking a
woman to a hospital once she reaches active labor to help ensure no delivery
complications occur).
91. See Nelson, 583 F.3d at 529 (declaring that the officer’s refusal to remove the
shackles impeded with the birthing process and caused severe undue pain and
suffering, resulting in a hernia and dislocated hip).
92. See id. at 529 (applying the holding in Estelle that denying or delaying a
prisoner’s access to medical care is cruel and unusual punishment).
93. See id. at 529, 531 (stating that these actions resulted in a wanton infliction of
unnecessary pain in violation of the Eighth Amendment).
94. See Estelle, 429 U.S. at 103 (noting the obligation of prison officials to ensure
that the Constitutional rights of prisoners remain intact during incarceration).
95. See Nelson, 583 F.3d at 526 (stating that shackling caused Nelson unnecessary
injuries, and that doctors could not properly attend to her due to her restrains, thus
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B. Shackling is Unconstitutional In Violation of the Eighth Amendment.
1. Shackling Laws Are Unconstitutional Under Nelson v. Correctional
Medical Services.
Pregnancy and labor are serious medical conditions.96 As is established
in Estelle, failing to provide care for a serious medical condition is a
constitutional violation.97 Therefore, policies permitting the shackling of
pregnant inmates during childbirth violate the Eighth Amendment of the
United States Constitution, which prohibits inflicting cruel and unusual
punishment.98
In Nelson v. Correctional Medical Services, the court touched on the
asserted security interests justifying shackling.99 Not only does the act of
shackling exhibit a deliberate indifference to the prisoner’s medical needs,
but in Nelson, and all other shackling cases, there is no competing
institutional need or penological interest served by the practice.100
Arguably, shackling would be permissible if it served some legitimate
objective, such as public safety.101 However, it is reasonable to assume that
no woman while in labor poses a flight risk.102 Thus, the policy of
shackling pregnant inmates during childbirth clearly does not provide the
requisite valid connection between prison regulations and the legitimate
governmental interests put forward to justify it.103 It is illogical to have
inhibiting her access to medical care).
96. See U.S. Equal Emp’t Opportunity Comm’n., Fact Sheet: The Family and
Medical Leave Act, the Americans with Disabilities Act, and Title VII of the Civil
Rights
Act
of
1964
(July
6,
2000),
available
at
http://www.eeoc.gov/policy/docs/fmlaada.html (stating that while pregnancy is not a
disability under the ADA, it is considered a serious condition under the Family and
Medical Leave Act).
97. See generally Estelle, 429 U.S. at 97 (holding that infringing on a prisoner’s
Constitutionally protected right to medical care constitutes cruel and unusual
punishment).
98. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII; see also Estelle, 429 U.S. at 104 (noting that ignoring
the medical needs of prisoners causes undue pain and suffering, delays access to
medical care, and often inhibits necessary medical attention).
99. See Nelson v. Corr. Med. Servs., 583 F.3d 522, 530-31 (8th Cir. 2009) (en
banc) (supposing the security interest to be the possibility of an inmate fleeing from the
hospital while in labor).
100. See id. (stating that there was no evidence in Nelson’s case to suggest that she
would flee or pose a security threat).
101. See id. at 533 (discussing the regulatory exception that would potentially allow
a corrections officer to shackle an inmate after delivery if there is clear and convincing
evidence that she poses a serious safety risk to herself, hospital staff, or the officer).
102. See id. at 531 (noting that Nelson was under the supervision of an experienced
correctional officer who was equipped with a fire arm, and that this is a sufficient form
of security).
103. But cf. Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 86, 91 (1987) (noting however, that
security and prevention of escape are legitimate governmental interests).
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genuine concerns that a woman in active labor poses a legitimate security
risk or would try to escape.104
A complaint must show two elements to successfully allege an Eighth
Amendment violation: 1) an objective standard, determining whether the
prisoner filing suit had a serious medical need or faced a risk to their health
or safety; and 2) a subjective standard, analyzing whether the prison
official had knowledge of the need or risk but ignored it.105 The Nelson
court found the objective and subjective prongs of the Eighth Amendment
standard easily satisfied.106 First, expert medical testimony satisfied the
objective standard when the doctor witness declared that it is always
dangerous to shackle a woman during the final stages of labor.107 Second,
statements from prison guard demonstrated her actual knowledge of risk to
the shackled prisoner and satisfied the subjective component of the Eighth
Amendment standard.108 Moreover, evidence that, as a result of being
shackled while in labor, Nelson soiled her bed sheets, causing her actual
discomfort and humiliation, and subjecting her to the risk of infection,
further satisfied the subjective standard.109 The court also noted that an
officer had been present while the nurses were attempting to help the
prisoner push her baby through the birth canal, and that medical personnel
had repeatedly asked for the removal of the shackles.110 Further, since the
prisoner was not a flight risk, she clearly established that the government
could not reasonably claim that her case warranted shackling.111
Applying Nelson’s holding, other cases are also obviously
unconstitutional.112 For example, in the case of Desiree C., prison guards
rushed her to the hospital with one ankle chained to a gurney, with
contractions every three minutes.113 She had an emergency C-section, and
104. Cf. Allen, supra note 6 (stating that the majority of convictions of pregnant
inmates are for non-violent crimes).
105. See Nelson, 583 F.3d at 529 (stipulating that there must be clear and convincing
evidence to satisfy these elements).
106. See id. (stating that the elements involve a showing of an excessive risk of
substantial harm).
107. See id. (relying on the testimony given at trial by an expert in the field of
obstetrics and gynecology).
108. See id. (finding that the jury could find that Officer Turensky knew of the risk
to Nelson simply because of the obviousness of the risk).
109. See id. at 526 (explaining that Nelson’s injuries prevent her from participating
in many activities and that she was advised not to have more children as a result of her
injuries).
110. See id. at 530 (observing no justification for continuing to shackle after
repeated requests on the part of medical personnel to unshackle the prisoner).
111. See id. at 522 (noting that there needs to be clear and convincing evidence of
flight risk).
112. See id. (applying a standard of deliberate indifference).
113. See Karen de Sá, Legislation Calls for an End to Cuffing Women During
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when she awoke from general anesthesia she spent four days in recovery,
shackled to a bed and under the watch of an armed guard.114 The shackles
made physical recovery more difficult, as her doctor instructed her to get
up and walk to help her stomach muscles heal.115
When applying the Nelson standard to this situation, it is clear that the
prison officials violated Desiree’s constitutional rights, as they showed a
clear deliberate indifference to her situation.116 Under Nelson, Desiree had
a clearly established right to not be shackled, as there was no clear and
convincing evidence that she was a flight risk.117 Further, Desiree was not
subject to humane conditions of confinement as prescribed under Nelson,
as she had to walk to aid her recovery while still in shackles.118 Under the
standards set forth in Nelson, Desiree experienced deliberate indifference
with regards to her medical condition and unnecessary pain and suffering
from the shackling, thus violating her Eighth Amendment rights.119
The existence of the obvious and simple alternative of supervising
pregnant inmates during childbirth, which many states are already doing,
and the lack of a logical connection between the goals of security and
prevention of escape and the policy permitting the shackling of pregnant
inmates during childbirth, demonstrate that this common practice and
prison policy is unconstitutional.120

Labor,
MERCURY
NEWS,
Aug.
1,
2005,
available
at
http://www.november.org/stayinfor/breaking3/ShacklingWomen.html (noting that
contractions that are three minutes apart constitute active labor).
114. See id. (stating that while the prisoner had an emergency C-section, the baby
still died).
115. See id. (noting that the shackles around the prisoner’s ankles seriously impeded
her ability to walk, as she was instructed to do so by her physician).
116. See Nelson, 583 F.3d at 522 (noting that it often takes several hours to reach
active labor, and as such prison officials were deliberately indifferent to the prisoner’s
medical needs if she did not arrive at the hospital until she was already in active labor,
meaning officials delayed her access to medical care).
117. See de Sá, supra note 113 (noting that Desiree was under anesthesia as part of
her emergency C-section, making it impossible for her to flee the hospital).
118. See Nelson, 583 F.3d at 529 (noting that the pain and restricted position of
confinement caused by the shackles brought unnecessary discomfort and humiliation
upon Nelson).
119. See id. at 531-32 (reasoning that the right to not be shackled is constitutionally
protected).
120. Compare Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 90 (1987) (holding that prison
regulations may amount to a constitutional violation if there are easy alternatives
indicating that the current regulation may be unreasonable), with AMNESTY INT’L USA,
NOT PART OF MY SENTENCE: VIOLATIONS OF THE HUMAN RIGHTS OF WOMEN IN
CUSTODY
11-12
(1999)
http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/asset/AMR51/019/1999/en/7588269a-e33d-11dd808b-bfd8d459a3de/amr510191999en.pdf (presenting clear alternatives for the
amendment of policies regarding state use of restraints during child birth that infringe
less upon the civil rights of pregnant prisoners).
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2. The Court in Women Prisoners v. District of Columbia Should Have
Found That Shackling Laws are Unconstitutional.
In Women Prisoners v. District of Columbia, the appellate court erred in
reversing the trial court and should have declared the practice of shackling
unconstitutional.121 This would have been a perfect opportunity for the
court to establish a clear standard with regards to the law.122 The court
should have let the standard set forth by the trial court stand, for had it done
so there would be a firm standard in case law declaring shackling illegal
and in violation of the Eighth Amendment.123 Instead, the decision leaves
the power to administer remedies for shackling in the hands of local D.C.
courts.124 However, this is insufficient, as it not only leaves D.C. without
any anti-shackling laws, but also provides ample opportunity for an uneven
application of a remedy.125
In Women Prisoners I, the trial court found the shackling of pregnant
women to be a violation of federal law.126 The trial court was correct in
ordering the appellants to hire a nurse midwife to provide services,
establish a pre-natal clinic, and arrange for obstetrical examinations within
women’s prisons.127 However, the United States Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia Circuit made a grave error in dissolving the
injunction.128 By doing so, the Court of Appeals left D.C. without a strict
anti-shackling standard.129 The Court of Appeals reasoned that because
courts have little experience in running a prison, they should give deference

121. See generally Women Prisoners v. D.C. Dep’t of Corr., 93 F.3d 910 (D.C. Cir.
1996) (noting that while the main focus of the case was prison conditions, the court
could have left intact the lower court’s ruling regarding the shackling of female
prisoners).
122. But see AMNESTY INT’L USA, ABUSE OF WOMEN IN CUSTODY, supra note 4, at
321 (noting that D.C. still has no legislation limiting the use of shackles on pregnant
inmates).
123. See Women Prisoners, 93 F.3d at 931-32 (inhibiting the establishment of an
actual standard, rather than simply leaving a potential remedy in such cases at the
discretion of the courts of the District of Columbia).
124. See id. (noting the reticence of the Court of Appeals to establish a standard on a
new and ambiguous law).
125. Cf. id. (making it more difficult for women who have been shackled to seek a
remedy because of the absence of an actual standard).
126. See id. at 916 (reviewing the lower court’s holding that shackling violates the
Eighth Amendment and the Civil Rights Act of 1871, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2006)).
127. See id. at 923 (establishing these measures as minimums in ob/gyn care in
prisons).
128. See id. (stating that while these measures may be highly desirable, the Supreme
Court has warned against such detailed orders because they circumvent the authority of
local legislatures).
129. See AMNESTY INT’L USA, ABUSE OF WOMEN IN CUSTODY, supra note 4, at 321
(noting that D.C. has no legislation limiting shackling).
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to prison officials where possible.130 The court erred in making this ruling,
as it created a self-regulating system for prisons.131 In vacating the order
for gynecological care, the Court of Appeals left pregnant inmates
defenseless against inhumane treatment and improper medical care.132 The
court leaves the regulation of caring for pregnant prisoners to local D.C.
Code, which has no formal provisions regarding shackling.133 As such, the
Court of Appeals aided the furtherance of an unconstitutional system by
leaving the practice of shackling unregulated and with no form of a legal
check on the system.134
C. Illinois, California, and New York Have All Outlawed Shackling and
Other States Should Follow Their Model and Move Towards Passing
Legislation that Also Outlaws Shackling.
In addition to violating the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition against
cruel and unusual punishment, shackling also violates state statutes
requiring a minimum standard of care for prisoners.135 Even worse than the
minimal number of state laws regulating the treatment of incarcerated
women during childbirth is the complete absence of a federal law aimed at
protecting pregnant women in prison.136 States such as California, Illinois,
and New York, chose to forego litigation in favor of a legislative
solution.137

130. See Women Prisoners III, 93 F.3d at 931-32 (regarding the running of the
prisons, program implementation, and prison upkeep).
131. Cf. id. (assuming—incorrectly—that prisons will always act in the best interest
of the prisoner).
132. See id. (vacating the order of the trial court, and leaving as recompense only the
ability for appellees to renew their arguments to the court regarding the substandard
medical care).
133. See AMNESTY INT’L USA, ABUSE OF WOMEN IN CUSTODY, supra note 4, at 321
(ignoring D.C.’s lack of legislation banning shackling).
134. See Women Prisoners, 93 F.3d at 931-32 (leaving the regulation of the prisons
up to the prison officials themselves, basing the regulation of shackling on non-existent
D.C. law, and providing no legal remedy for clear Eighth Amendment violations).
135. Compare CAL. PENAL CODE § 6030(e)-(f) (West 2011) (calling for prenatal and
postpartum care for pregnant inmates, as well as prohibiting shackling of prisoners who
are in labor), with N.Y. CORREC. LAW § 611 (McKinney 2011) (prohibiting restraints
on prisoners who are in labor, except under extraordinary circumstances, during which
they may be cuffed by one wrist); see also Liptak, supra note 25 (stating that the New
York law is very similar to those enacted by California and Illinois).
136. See AMNESTY INT’L USA, ABUSE OF WOMEN IN CUSTODY, supra note 4, at 328
(observing that there is no U.S. Bureau of Prisons legislation nor an agency policy that
bans the shackling of pregnant inmates).
137. See Liptak, supra note 25 (commenting on a New York bill similar to statutes
enacted by California and Illinois, that has subsequently been adopted).
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1. Other States Should Follow the Model Laid Out by the Illinois Law and
Enact Laws Banning Shackling.
In 2000, the Illinois legislature amended the state’s Unified Code of
Corrections to add an anti-shackling provision.138 The revised statute
clearly lays out the standard that prohibits restraints on an inmate in labor
during any point of her transport or delivery.139
Unfortunately, despite the strict shackling prohibitions in Illinois law, the
practice is still widely used, and the case of Latiana Walton is just one
example of the gross disobedience of these crucial laws.140 Walton—
another non-violent offender—had an arm and leg chained to her bed
during labor, and wrist handcuffed throughout the entire delivery.141 The
Illinois Unified Code of Corrections clearly states that when a pregnant
inmate is brought to a hospital for the purposes of giving birth, under no
circumstances may handcuffs, shackles, or restraints of any kind can be
used during labor.142 The statute does allow for the posting of a
correctional officer immediately outside the delivery room, but even this is
disregarded, and corrections officers often stay in the delivery room.143
The case of Latiana exhibits a gross violation of not only Illinois state
law regarding the minimum standard of care for inmates and the use of
shackles on pregnant inmates during delivery, but also a person’s
constitutionally protected Eighth Amendment right against cruel and
unusual punishment.144
Other states, such as Louisiana, which currently have no legislation
limiting the use of shackles on pregnant inmates and allows restraints on
inmates in the third trimester as well as during transport and labor, should
adopt the Illinois standards.145 Louisiana could easily adopt certain
138. See 730 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/3-6-7 (West 2011) (stating that when a pregnant
female is brought to a hospital for the purposes of delivering her baby, no shackles,
handcuffs, or restraints of any kind may be used).
139. See id. (noting the absence of language that allows for shackling if a guard feels
that the inmate is a security risk, providing a much stricter anti-shackling standard).
140. See Mastony, supra note 2 (noting that Illinois passed anti-shackling legislation
in 1999, and twelve years later, it is still disregarded).
141. See id. (stating that Walton’s original charge was for retail theft, and her
incarceration stemmed from missing a court date).
142. See 730 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/3-6-7 (noting that prohibitions on shackling apply
during transportation to the hospital and delivery).
143. See Mastony, supra note 2 (recounting the case of Melissa Hall, an inmate who
was not only shackled during delivery, but also had a guard sitting in her room
watching the NBA finals during the entirety of her labor).
144. See id. (showing a willful disregard on the part of the corrections officer since
the officer repeatedly ignored the doctor’s request that Walton’s shackles be removed).
145. See AMNESTY INT’L USA, ABUSE OF WOMEN IN CUSTODY, supra note 4, at 137
(stating that Louisiana allows four and five point restrains on pregnant inmates and
allows for the application of leg irons and handcuffs during delivery).
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provisions from the Illinois statute—such as prohibiting leg irons on a
woman in labor—making its current laws illegal.146 The legislative intent
of the Illinois anti-shackling legislation is to protect the well-being of the
child and mother, and to not inflict any undue pain or suffering caused by
shackling.147 States such as Louisiana should strive to enforce this
objective within their own legislation.148
A clear example of where shackling caused undue pain and suffering in
Louisiana is the case of Joe Doe B., where corrections officers left her in
shackles after she went into labor.149 Under Illinois law, the Louisiana law
is unconstitutional, as Illinois strictly prohibits the use of shackles during
active labor.150 Shackling during active labor is unconstitutional because it
serves no legitimate purpose and causes undue pain and suffering.151
2. Other States Should Follow the Model Laid Out by California Law and
Enact Laws Banning Shackling.
In 2005, the California Legislature followed Illinois’ example by passing
an anti-shackling provision.152 The legislature’s decision to ban the
practice of shackling prisoners adheres to United Nations policy.153 The
146. See id. (noting that the ACLU has filed a lawsuit in Louisiana regarding the
Orleans Parish Prison’s policy of keeping women shackled during labor).
147. Cf. 730 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/3-6-7 (showing how a revision of the full Unified
Code of Corrections and the penal code of Illinois exhibits a philosophical shift in the
legislature, the recognition of the barbarity of the practice, and the necessity to
implement anti-shackling provisions in all sections of Illinois law).
148. See id. (allowing the pregnant prisoner to have the freedom of movement she
needs to deliver her baby while also ensuring that she is adequately monitored by
prison officers).
149. See AMNESTY INT’L USA, ABUSE OF WOMEN IN CUSTODY, supra note 4, at 138
(noting that Louisiana policy is to place a guard outside the delivery room door, which
serves the legitimate safety interest in question without causing undue pain and
suffering).
150. Cf. 730 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/3-6-7; AMNESTY INT’L USA, ABUSE OF WOMEN IN
CUSTODY, supra note 4, at 112 (stating that in addition to its anti-shackling efforts,
Illinois also has programs in place for inmate mothers and their infants where the child
can reside with the mother until he or she is one year old).
151. See 730 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/3-6-7 (showing the state’s obligatory interest in the
care of prisoners by making the Sherriff responsible for providing adequate personnel
to monitor the health of the inmate).
152. CAL. PENAL CODE § 5007.7 (West 2011); see AMNESTY INT’L USA, ABUSE OF
WOMEN IN CUSTODY, supra note 4, at 61 (showing that, prior to the implementation of
the 2006 law, California had no policy that prevented female prisoners from being
shackled to their hospital beds during labor and throughout their hospital stay).
153. See AMNESTY INT’L USA, ABUSE OF WOMEN IN CUSTODY, supra note 4, at 22
(recommending that pregnant inmates taken to a hospital for the purposes of giving
birth shall not be shackled by the ankles, wrists, or both); see also California
Legislature Considering Bill That Would Ban Shackling of Prison Inmates During
NEWS.
TODAY,
AUG.
2,
2005,
Childbirth,
MED.
http://www.medicalnewstoday.com/releases/28474.php (noting that the previous
justification for shackling inmates during labor was a public safety issue and to prevent
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legislature’s reliance on the United Nations policy against shackling shows
a clearer human rights standard than the legislation used in Illinois.154 The
California statute states that once an inmate is in labor, she shall not be
shackled by the ankles, wrists, or both, and that she will be transported in
the least restrictive way possible.155
California’s statute can extend to a state like Minnesota, which has no
anti-shackling legislation.156 Not only does Minnesota have no legislation
limiting the use of shackling on pregnant inmates, but the state has a
written policy requiring that inmates be restrained during medical
procedures and be restrained to the bed with at least one set of restraints at
all times.157 Minnesota has the least progressive shackling laws of any
state, requiring the use of restraints during transportation and labor, and
requiring an officer inside the delivery room during delivery.158 All of
these provisions should be illegal, and they could be in Minnesota if the
state adopted the regulations of the California statute.159 If, under
California law, it is illegal to shackle a woman during active labor, this
standard should apply to Minnesota, making the requirement under
Minnesota law that prisoners have at least one shackle during active labor
unconstitutional.160 The Minnesota law flouts the legislative intent of the
California code, disregarding all concepts of basic human dignity and
civility, when in actuality those same elements of humanity and decency
can, and should, be the driving force behind shackling legislation.161
their escape).
154. See California Legislature Considering Bill That Would Ban Shackling of
Prison Inmates During Childbirth, supra note 153 (implying that United Nations
standards are synonymous with International Human Rights standards, showing that the
shift in legislation was morally motivated and aimed to address the issue of human
decency).
155. Compare CAL. PENAL CODE § 5007.7 (stating merely that transportation must
occur in the least restrictive way possible, and suggesting a more flexible standard),
with 730 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/3-6-7 (specifying strictly that no restraints of any kind be
used during childbirth related transportation).
156. See AMNESTY INT’L USA, ABUSE OF WOMEN IN CUSTODY, supra note 4, at 16869 (elaborating that Minnesota has no legislation limiting the use of shackling on
pregnant inmates during the third trimester and a policy that they are to be shackled
during labor).
157. See id. at 168 (noting that, according to the Minnesota Department of
Corrections, there are no administrative rules concerning pregnancy and delivery in
Minnesota).
158. See MINN. STAT. ANN. § 241.07 (West 2011) (noting that officers will only
partially remove shackles if requested by a doctor, and that officers are authorized to
refuse the request all together).
159. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 5007.7.
160. See id.
161. See MINN. STAT. ANN. § 241.07 (noting that Minnesota law dictates the use of
full restraints—waist chain, black box over handcuffs and leg irons—during
transportation of an inmate for the purpose of giving birth, which, when viewed under
California law is clearly unconstitutional).
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3. Other States Should Follow the Model Laid Out by New York Law and
Enact Laws Banning Shackling.
The New York law accomplishes the same goals as its California and
Illinois counterparts.162 The bill allows the cuffing of women by one wrist
during transfer if they are deemed a risk, but otherwise forbids any
mechanical restraint during transport when a woman is in labor and
admitted to a hospital for delivery or is recovering after giving birth.163
The justification for the Assembly bill was the recognition that New York
was still one of the many states that permitted the shackling of pregnant
inmates.164 In New York City, a 1990 consent decree agreement ended the
shackling of pregnant inmates, recognizing that the use of mechanical
restraints on a pregnant inmate constituted a cruel and inhumane form of
punishment and posed a serious risk to both the mother and her unborn
child.165 While New York recognized a need for cohesion in the laws of
the entire state, other states without shackling laws should recognize the
need to come in line with the necessary statutory provisions outlined in
other state laws.166
One such state that should take this step is Oklahoma, as it currently has
no legislation limiting the use of shackling on pregnant inmates.167
Oklahoma allows the shackling of inmates during their third trimester,
transport to the hospital for childbirth, and during labor.168 The legislative
intent of the New York bill easily applies to the statutes of Oklahoma.169
When persuasively applying the authority of the New York bill, which
162. See N.Y. CORRECT. LAW § 611 (McKinney 2011) (prohibiting the use of
restraints of any kind from being used during labor).
163. See id. (noting that the minimal restraint during transport only applies if the
inmate is a hazard to herself or others, or is a flight risk).
164. See id. (recognizing that the practice served no penological purpose as adequate
safeguards could be implemented without the shackling of the prisoner in addition to
the notion that if New York enacted anti-shackling legislation that other states might
follow suit); see also Pa. House Panel Approves Anti-Shackling Bill, PA INQUIRER, Jan.
27, 2010, available at http://www.prisonofficer.org/pennsylvania/10639-antishackling-bill.html (stating that the pending anti-shackling legislation in Pennsylvania
is a direct result of the New York anti-shackling legislation).
165. See Assemb. B. 4105, 2007 Leg., 230th Sess. (N.Y. 2007) (recognizing a need
for the laws of the entire state to strive to achieve a unified purpose and have a similar
legislative intent).
166. See id. (noting that it would be easy for a state like Oklahoma to follow in the
footsteps of a state like New York and mimic its shackling legislation).
167. See AMNESTY INT’L USA, ABUSE OF WOMEN IN CUSTODY, supra note 4, at 241
(noting that Oklahoma does not publish any administrative rules concerning pregnancy
and delivery).
168. See id. at 242 (noting that the state also requires the presence of a corrections
officer in the delivery room).
169. See Assemb. B. 4105 (applying the reasoning that too many states currently
permit shackling of female prisoners and the practice violates the code of human
decency).
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clearly prohibits shackling during active labor, the practices in Oklahoma such as only removing restraints during labor if the attending physician,
head of the medical facility, and head of the correctional facility are all in
agreement—should be illegal.170
All three pieces of model legislation described above contain clauses that
would allow prison officials or attending physicians to mandate the use of
limited physical restraints in the case of a specific health or security risk.171
The legislators in Illinois, California, and New York, however, have
recognized an important policy paradigm shift: shackling pregnant inmates
should be a rare exception rather than the norm, and the decision to use
physical restraints on a woman in active labor must be made carefully and
for justifiable reasons.172
IV. POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS
Preemptive legislation banning the shackling of inmates during labor and
delivery is far superior to waiting until a legal injury occurs.173 Drafting
legislation serves myriad purposes, such as keeping an injury from
occurring in the first place, keeping cases out of the court system, and
providing national guidance.174 Unfortunately, prisoners are unpopular
with the public, politically powerless, and often legally unsophisticated.175
Sadly, in states where shackling is illegal, the wave of lawsuits
challenging shackling demonstrates that shackling continues to be a
prevalent practice despite the law.176

170. Compare id., with AMNESTY INT’L USA, ABUSE OF WOMEN IN CUSTODY, supra
note 4, at 242 (applying the New York statute to Oklahoma, it becomes apparent that
the legislative intent similarly applies to Oklahoma, as the New York statute seeks to
eliminate the prevalence of laws permitting shackling).
171. Accord 730 CAL. PENAL CODE § 5007.7 (West 2011); ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/3-6-7
(West 2011); Assemb. B. 4105 (addressing concerns of corrections officers who justify
shackling pregnant inmates in two major ways: 1) physical restraints restrict prisoners’
movements in a way that protects medical personnel and prison officers, and 2)
prisoners are prevented from escaping).
172. See Assemb. B. 4105 (acknowledging the legitimate justification of public
safety).
173. See Andrea Hsu, Difficult Births: Laboring and Delivering in Shackles,
July
16,
2010,
NPR.ORG,
http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=128563037 (showing by a jury’s
award of $1 that relief is not always easy to obtain for claims relating to shackling of
pregnant prisoners).
174. See 730 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/3-6-7 (2000) (noting that legislation would most
importantly prevent such a gross violation of Constitutional rights).
175. See id. (citing reasons for why often prisoner legislation is not often
aggressively pursued).
176. See Mastony, supra note 2 (reporting that since 2008 more than twenty former
female inmates have filed lawsuits against the Cook County Sheriff’s Office alleging
incidents of shackling while giving birth).
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Circumstances like those in Illinois raise concerns about drafting
effective legislation in other states.177 One notable difference between the
statutes of New York and California versus Illinois, is that both New York
and California include provisions that would allow for the shackling of a
prisoner if it is deemed necessary for the safety of the inmate, the staff, or
the public, or if the prisoner is a flight risk.178
States such as Pennsylvania and Georgia are currently making strides
towards establishing anti-shackling legislation.179 Under Pennsylvania’s
Senate Bill 1074, corrections officers are still permitted to use restraints in
extreme situations.180 This provision seems to be the mark of a
successfully enforced piece of anti-shackling legislation.181 While Georgia
is not as far along as Pennsylvania, it is moving towards drafting antishackling legislation.182 In order to draft successful shackling legislation
that is actually enforced, Georgia will have to specify that guards may not
use restraints during transportation or delivery, while still allowing for
some security provisions in extreme cases.183
In October 2008, the Federal Bureau of Prisons issued a new policy
mandating that inmates in labor, delivery, or post-delivery recuperation
shall not be placed in restraints unless there are reasonable grounds to
believe the inmate presents an immediate, serious threat of hurting herself
or others, or there are reasonable grounds to believe the inmate presents an
immediate and credible risk of escape.184 Similarly, in April 2008,
177. See Allen, supra note 6 (recognizing that the legislation needs to be enforced,
and therefore needs to take into consideration the justifications of the prisons such as
public safety).
178. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 5007.7 (West 2011); Assemb. B. 4105 (providing that
these provisions apply only in extreme circumstances).
179. See CTR. FOR REPRODUCTIVE RIGHTS, 2010 State Legislative Wrap Up,
available at http://reproductiverights.org/en/feature/2010-state-legislative-wrap-up
(noting that Pennsylvania is actually in the process of enacting an anti-shackling laws,
whereas Georgia is still in the beginning stages of building momentum for legislation).
180. See Pa. House Panel Approves Anti-Shackling Bill, supra note 164 (stating that
the Senate Judiciary Committee endorsed the Healthy Birth for Incarcerated Women
Act in a unanimous vote).
181. See id. (claiming that because Pennsylvania had no law banning the use of
shackles, and so for the interest of security purposes, shackling became a default
practice).
182. See Rachel Roth, AMA Opposes Shackling Pregnant Women in Labor, RH
REALITY
CHECK,
June
16,
2010,
available
at
http://www.rhrealitycheck.org/node/13676 (noting that activists are very vocally
pressing the issue).
183. See Our Work: Congress Passes the Second Chance Act, REBECCA PROJECT
FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, http://www.rebeccaproject.org/index.php?option=com_content
&task=view&id=236&Itemid=152 (acknowledging the need to allow for shackles in
extreme circumstances where the safety of others may be jeopardized and to potentially
allow a guard to be posted outside an inmate’s room).
184. See id. (reporting a working relationship between lawmakers and the Rebecca
Project for Human Rights).
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President Bush signed the Second Chance Act into law, which requires that
all federal correctional facilities document and report the use of physical
restraints on pregnant female prisoners during pregnancy, labor, delivery,
and post-delivery, and justify the use of the restraints with documented
security concerns.185
The current patchwork system of laws, regulations, written, and
unwritten policies has created an atmosphere of confusion and
noncompliance.186 Even in states with legislative bans on the practice of
shackling, there have been anecdotal reports that the practice continues to
be employed on women during labor and delivery.187 It is not uncommon
for changes in department of corrections’ directives or policies to go
uncommunicated to prison guards, or for such policies to be applied with
such discretion as to essentially permit the practice in nearly all
circumstances.188 It is clear that while great progress has been made in the
effort to end the shackling of incarcerated women during labor and delivery
in the past ten years, considerably more needs to be done.
V. CONCLUSION
Women who have already been seriously physically injured as a result of
the use of shackles during pregnancy and childbirth may still be able to use
the court system to obtain monetary damages.189 However, in order to
prevent future injury or to simply protest the practice as a human rights
violation, female prisoners and their advocates will most likely have to turn
to alternative methods of relief.190 In Illinois, California, and New York,
state legislatures have severely limited the ability of prison officials to
185. See Second Chance Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-199, 122 Stat. 657 (2008)
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 17501 et seq. (Supp. 2008) (adding extra
restrictions to disincentivize the practice, such as ensuring that facilities provide
Congress with explanations regarding the reasons for using restraints in particular
instances).
186. Richard Winton, Jail Care for Women is Criticized, L.A. TIMES, July 12, 2008,
at B3 (noting that even though California has a state law prohibiting the use of
shackling of a female inmate during childbirth, the Los Angeles County Jail system has
not implemented any policies to reflect the law, and that leg chains, which are heavy
but long enough to allow the inmate to get to the bathroom, are often present during
childbirth).
187. See id. (detailing a special counsel’s investigation of the written policies of the
Los Angeles jail system).
188. See Mastony, supra note 2 (noting the difficulty of enforceability of state
statutes prohibiting shackling during childbirth due to differing interpretations of the
word “labor”).
189. See Second Chance Act of 2008 (providing a much needed form of relief to
those that can no longer bring an Eighth Amendment violation claim).
190. See Winton, supra note 186 (blaming a lack of relief for those injured on a
backlog in the court systems and the complexity of stating a viable Eighth Amendment
claim).
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shackle pregnant or birthing prisoners.191 With the Eighth Circuit’s
decision, there is now a federal standard declaring the practice of shackling
unconstitutional for violating the Eighth Amendment.192 Thus, the law of
any state that allows for the shackling of female inmates during labor or
delivery is unconstitutional under the Nelson standard.193
State departments of corrections and state legislators should follow the
example set by California, Illinois, and New York and enact and implement
state regulations and legislation to protect pregnant inmates who give birth
while incarcerated, thus bringing the country in line with its constitutional
obligations.194

191. E.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 5007.7 (West 2011); 730 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/3-6-7
(West 2011); N.Y. CORRECT. LAW § 611 (McKinney 2011).
192. See generally Nelson v. Corr. Med. Servs., 583 F.3d 522 (8th Cir. 2009)
(declaring shackling a form of cruel and unusual punishment).
193. See id. at 534 (holding that it was unconstitutional to shackle Nelson because
the pain and suffering she experienced as a result violated her Eighth Amendment
rights).
194. See AMNESTY INT’L USA, ABUSE OF WOMEN IN CUSTODY, supra note 4, at 24
(noting the obligation to be sensitive to the pregnant inmate’s health needs, and not
inflict cruel and unusual punishment).
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